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NON-LAWYER JUDGES: THE LONG ROAD NORTH
ALLAN ASHMAN*
DAVID L. LEE**
In the Old West, so the legend goes, after the pathfinders came the
cartographers. They mapped true trails and rejected uncertain routes, noted
prominent guideposts and omitted obscure signs. Recently, in North v.
Russell,' the United States Supreme Court could have followed this tradi-
tion by mapping a true rule through the arguments surrounding non-lawyer
judges. Such guidance would have been welcomed by appellate courts,
which for years have been stumbling through this wilderness of history,
logic, and policy. In North, however, the Supreme Court drew not a map
but a maze. By ignoring the basic questions in favor of de novo trials and
trained lay judges, the Court may have led other courts astray.
This article will examine the status of lay judges in the United States
after North. It will discuss their history, their advantages, and their disad-
vantages. Finally, the constitutional arguments surrounding their existence
will be explored. As will be seen, the North case, instead of providing
answers to state courts grappling with the issues of lay judges and de novo
trials, has only raised more questions.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
American lay judges, hybrids of colonial, frontier, and industrial influ-
ences, bear little resemblance to their modern European or ancient Roman
counterparts. Yet, to fully appreciate the current legal assault on the Ameri-
can lay judge, knowing the political and legal evolution of the institution is
helpful.
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** Herbert Harley Fellow, American Judicature Society; J.D., Northwestern University.
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1. 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
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The Romans bequeathed to Europe the conception of a judge as a
trained, specialized professional with complete command over and active
duties at every stage of the litigation. 2 Yet, paradoxically, throughout its
creation and at its zenith Roman law knew no such thing as a professional
judge. Indeed, when professional judges began to emerge in the late classi-
cal period, the lawyers of that era preferred to ignored them.
3
For the first 500 years of recorded Roman law, there were no judges for
whom judging was in any sense a profession. Until the end of the Republic,
all judges were unspecialized laymen. Jurists supplied the lay judge with
potential rules of decision. It was the jurist, and not the lay judge, who was
the custodian and transmitter of doctrine,4 the "oracle of the law."
. Duing the Middle Ages, the classic Roman division of responsibility
between the judge who decided cases and the jurist who kept and transmitted
doctrine was maintained. But between 1300 and 1789, almost all continental
European countries replaced lay judges with professional judges. In France,
for example, lay judges were common in the thirteenth century, but gradual-
ly disappeared during the fourteenth century. Professional judges, no matter
what their background or training, became responsible for trying and decid-
ing cases.
5
Among the European countries, only England preserved and expanded
the use of lay judges. In Britain, lay justice, best exemplified by the
magistrates' courts, remains an integral part of the administration of jus-
6tice. Ironically, England's early professional judges, by developing an
elaborate system of national law, made room for laymen in the judicial
system. When Edward III created the office of the justice of the peace early
in the fourteenth century, he created an institution which, for centuries, has
persisted tenaciously in our jurisprudence.
7
The office of justice of the peace reflected the active role taken in their
own community by laymen of high standing. Although drawn from a
circumscribed class, English justices of the peace nevertheless became
powerful agents in preserving and extending local self-government. By the
sixteenth century, justices of the peace, squires, and, frequently, members of
Parliament were administering an increasingly important body of law. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries their jurisdiction expanded to include
regulatory economic legislation. During the nineteenth century, however,
2. J. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 30 (1960).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 29.
5. Id. at 87.
6. See Reichert, The Magistrates' Courts: Lay Cornerstone of English Justice, 57 JUD.
138 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Reichert].
7. See F. MAITLAND, THE CONSITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 206 (1961).
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justices of the peace gradually lost authority to administrative bodies and
higher courts. Today, English justices of the peace, typically unpaid and
untrained in the law, principally hear traffic offenses and other minor
violations.
8
The authority of lay judges in the magistrates' courts, on the other
hand, has not been diminished. In fact, lay magistrates today try more than
ninety-eight percent of all criminal cases in England. Although London has
approximately fifty full-time professional "stipendiaries" who are retired
lawyers, the 20,000 or so magistrates who sit in the rest of England and in
Wales are volunteer lay persons. 9 While theoretically almost anyone can
become a magistrate (indeed, creating a cross-section of the community on
the bench is an important goal), lay volunteers must participate in the
compulsory training programs for magistrates which were initiated in
1966. l0
This tradition of non-lawyer judges was brought to America by the
early English settlers. Although the office of the justice of peace played an
important part in colonial government," it, like other colonial institutions,
soon evolved away from its English counterpart. American justices of the
peace came to hear civil cases and also began to be paid. "With the advent
of Jacksonian democracy in the first part of the nineteenth century, most
state legislatures provided for popular elections of JPs" and the position
"came to be filled by people of humble calling and scant education.''12
Since society and commerce were relatively simple, the part-time, lay judge
could efficiently administer to the needs of his community.' 3 In the early
part of our history, there were few lawyers and the laws were simple. In
addition, slow transportation among the communities of sparsely populated
states made it almost impossible for the handful of attorney judges to cover
all the rural areas. But as society became more complex and its legal system
more sophisticated, the administration of the law by those lacking any
formal legal education was increasingly questioned.
This questioning had its effect, even though in the early 1900s nearly
every state constitution mentioned the justice of the peace as a judicial
officer and a majority of state constitutions included it in the list of named
8. Note, Justice Courts in Oregon, 53 ORE. L. REV. 411,413 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Justice Courts in Oregon].
9. See Reichert, supra note 6, at 138.
10. Id.
I . Note, The Justice of the Peace in Virginia: A Neglected Aspect of the Judiciary, 52 VA.
L. REV. 151, 156 (1966) [hereinafter cited as The Justice of the Peace in Virginia].
12. Justice Courts in Oregon, supra note 8, at 413.
13. See, e.g., Dolan & Fenton, The Justice of the Peace in Nebraska, 48 NEB. L. REV. 457
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Dolan & Fenton]; see also Justice Courts in Oregon, supra note 8, at
414; The Justice of the Peace in Virginia, supra note 11, at 156.
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courts vested with judicial power. 4 For example, as early as 1920 there was
pressure to abolish the justice of the peace courts in Nebraska. One reason
given at the time for opposing abolition was simply that one should not
replace a piece of judicial furniture that had worn so well in the past,
regardless of the contemporary need for it.I5 In 1934 the reformers had one
of their first successes when the Virginia legislature stripped their justices of
the peace of all trial jurisdiction.' 
6
Today, although most states are either abolishing justices of the peace
or reducing their power,' 7 non-lawyer judges are not facing imminent
extinction. They have been remarkably resilient through centuries of dra-
matic growth and change. Despite the complexities of modern law, many
jurisdictions still feel that local justice should be administered by a local
justice. 18
This feeling has been reflected in the reluctance of most states to
eliminate their lay judges. Only six jurisdictions currently are, or presently
will be without non-lawyer judges.' 9 Five other states now permit non-
lawyer judges in certain courts pursuant to "grandfather" provisions in their
relevant court-organization statutes. 20 Upon their death or retirement, non-
lawyer judges in these states will be replaced by lawyer judges. Thus, in
only ten states and the District of Columbia have non-lawyer judges been
either discontinued or gradually eliminated. Of the remaining forty states,
some retain non-lawyer judges only in certain courts under restricted cir-
cumstances ,21 while others retain them under generally unrestricted circum-
stances. 22
14. See Comment, Due Process and Lay Judges, 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 329, 342 (1975); see
also Smith, The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 CAL. L. REV. 118 (1927).
15. See Dolan & Fenton, supra note 13, at 458.
16. The Justice of the Peace in Virginia, supra note 11, at 163.
17. For example, Virginia created a salaried "trial justice" system in which the trial
justice, now called the county judge, replaced the justice of the peace as the principal court of
limited jurisdiction. Virginia's denying justices of the peace the power to try cases was
acclaimed as a progressive step and a desirable solution to the justice of the peace problem.
Nevertheless, justices of the peace were not abolished per se; currently there are about 700 to
800 justices of the peace in the state, many of them quite active. Justices of the peace still have
the specific powers to issue warrants, attachments, and subpoenas within the jurisdiction of
and returnable to the trial justice, and the general power to set bail. See generally, The Justice of
the Peace in Virginia, supra note 11, at 163-64.
18. See, e.g., Comment, Justice Court Reform in Montana, 34 MONT. L. REV. 122, 123-24
(1973).
19. Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, the District of Columbia, and, as of
January, 1980, Indiana. See Table A.
20. California's justice courts; Illinois' associate circuit judges; Michigan's probate courts
and municipal courts not of record; Minnesota's county courts and justice courts; and New
Hampshire's municipal courts. See Table B.
21. For example, Kentucky, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Wyoming permit non-lawyer
judges in certain courts if no lawyers are available. Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Missouri, and
Washington permit non-lawyer judges in certain courts in sparsely populated areas of the state.
See Table C.
22. For example, in 33 states non-lawyer judges are permitted without restriction in pro-
bate, justice, city, municipal, surrogate, county, mayor's, town, family, and district courts. See
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Colorado and Maryland are among those states which place severe
restrictions on non-lawyer judges. For example, the 1962 judiciary amend-
ment to Colorado's constitution requires all judges to be lawyers except
judges of: (1) county courts in counties of low population; and (2) municipal
courts. Of the 107 county court judges in the state, approximately twenty-
five are not lawyers. The non-lawyer judges handle approximately three
percent of all county court cases. Of Colorado's 168 municilfal court judges,
118 are not lawyers. The non-lawyer judges are all part-time and handle
primarily traffic cases. 23 Maryland allows non-lawyer judges only in its
Orphan's Court, which is primarily a probate court. Of the state's sixty-six
Orphan's Court judges, the majority are not lawyers, but they have no
power to jail.24
In other states, however, the power of non-lawyer judges has not been
restricted, and these judges remain a crucial part of the judiciary. In
Arkansas, for example, case-load statistics for 1975 reveal that the follow-
ing cases were handled by judges without legal training: 8,385 juvenile
cases filed before county judges; 26,074 cases filed in major's and police
courts, where fines totaling $1.1 million were collected; 6,023 cases filed in
justice of the peace courts, where the fines and costs totaling $271,719 were
collected; and 364 cases filed before county judges in common pleas court.
In addition, eighty-nine municipal courts had 503,725 cases and collected
$12.2 million in fines and costs.
25
THE ROAD TO NORTH
Case Law and Arguments
Given this historical background, not until the late 1960s did litigants
dare to challenge lay judges on direct, constitutional grounds. At first, the
courts did not take these challenges seriously. For example, in Melikian v.
A vent, 26 a three-judge federal court unanimously held that the argument that
non-lawyer judges were unconstitutional was "unique and of no merit." 
27
Notwithstanding this categorical language, courts soon were seriously
analyzing such allegations. In the wake of Argersinger v. Hamlin,28 the
typical challenger of lay judges contended that an accused was deprived of
Table D. Vermont still permits non-lawyers to hear questions of fact. See note 79 and accom-
panying text infra.
23. Ashman & Chapin, Is the Bell Tolling for Nonlawyer Judges?, 59 JUD. 417,421 (1976).
24. Id. at 421.
25. REPORT FROM THE STATE CAPITALS 1-2 (B. Jones pub. 1977).
26. 300 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
27. Id. at 519.
28. 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extending the right to counsel to any defendant facing a possible
jail sentence).
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his constitutional right to counsel because these judges could not understand
legal arguments. The courts developed three basic responses to this conten-
tion.
The first response, adopted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Ditty
v. Hampton ,29 rejected this right-to-counsel argument on the merits. The
court reasoned that since the state was certain to use a lawyer, the defense
counsel was needed to balance the adversary system. The judge, the court
noted, not being an adversary of the defendant, was outside this equation.
Since a judge merely chose between two well-presented sides, he need only
be fair and impartial.3 °
The second response, articulated by the Supreme Court of California in
Gordon v. Justice Court for Yuba Judicial District of Sutter County,
3 1
accepted the right-to-counsel argument on the merits. The court believed
that the increased complexity of criminal law and of criminal procedure
made it unlikely that a lay judge could understand the legal issues in a
case.
32
The third response, advanced by the Supreme Court of Utah in Shel-
midine v. Jones,33 ignored the right-to-counsel argument because of the
government's excuse of necessity. The court pointed out that "there are no
attorneys resident in five of our counties, one county has only one, three
counties have only two, and several others have only three or four attor-
neys. " 34
The right-to-counsel argument soon developed its own jurisprudence.
Both Texas35 and New Mexico 36 rejected Gordon in favor of Ditty and
found no constitutional problem in using lay judges. Lower courts in New
York also refused to apply Gordon .37 The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in a
prescient opinion, decided that lay judges were constitutional given Min-
nesota's trial de novo system. 38 Oregon and Wyoming ruled that Gordon
was inapplicable to preliminary hearings.39 In Pennsylvania, a lower court
29. 490 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1972), appeal dismissed as moot, 414 U.S. 885 (1973).
30. Id. at 774-75.
31. 12 Cal. 3d 323,525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975).
32. Id. at 328, 525 P.2d at 75, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
33. 550 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976).
34. Id. at 211.
35. Ex Parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975).
36. Tsiosdia v. Rainaldi, 89 N.M. 70, 547 P.2d 553 (1976). The court also relied in part on
trial de novo.
37. People v. Skrynski, - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d -(1977); In re Hewitt,
81 Misc. 2d 202, 365 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Tompkins County Ct. 1975).
38. State v. Lindgren, - Minn. -, 235 N.W.2d 379 (1956) (per curiam).
39. State v. Pfeiffer, 25 Or. App. 45, 548 P.2d 174 (1976); Thomas v. Justice Court of
Washakie County, 538 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 1975).
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held that Gordon could not be invoked by the prosecutor of a private
criminal suit.4°
Unfortunately, none of these cases provided a penetrating analysis of
the right-to-counsel argument. The courts which rejected the argument
failed to meet it squarely. Surely, if judges expressly decided cases without
using any laws-if, for example, they decided cases on the color of the
plaintiff's eyes-they would certainly deprive the unlucky party of the
benefit of counsel. Thus, once it is admitted that a judge can negate the
effective assistance of counsel, the question becomes whether a non-lawyer
judge necessarily, or even usually, does so.
Similarly, the courts which accepted the right-to-counsel argument
were guilty of faulty logic. The steps in the right-to-counsel argument are
virtually undisputed. Everything from the right itself to the necessity for
counsel to be effective and understood can be supported either by case law
or by the United States Constitution. 4 The crucial assumption in the argu-
ment is that somebody who is not a lawyer cannot understand legal argu-
ments. For example, Justice Rose, dissenting in Thomas v. Justice Court of
Washakie County,4 2 argued:
If . . . the lawyer is present to call . . . intricate matters to
the court's attention, must not there be someone learned in legal
matters present to hear the call? Isn't that the other half of giving
the defendant the full measure of his due process protection?
It would have done Einstein no good to have explained his
theory of relativity to me. I would not have understood it. I am not
equipped to understand it. The same, I feel, applies to a layman
justice of peace .... 43
The assumption that a non-lawyer judge cannot understand legal argu-
ments deserves a more thorough analysis than it has received." Perhaps the
courts have not probed more deeply into this assumption because it lies in
the grey area of the law's relation to unlearned people. On the one hand, all
men are presumed to know the law. But this venerable presumption prob-
ably does not reflect reality as much as it preserves the supremacy of law.
40. In re Piscanio, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 490, 344 A.2d 658 (1975).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (counsel must be
allowed to consult with client during recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975)
(counsel must be permitted to make oral summary of the evidence); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel in any trial involving a possible jail sentence).
42. 538 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 1975).
43. Id. at 54 (emphasis in original). Justice Rose went on to say that the justices of peace
were not at fault, but, rather "the system which places such a heavy burden of responsibility
upon untrained people in an area of human relations that demands training and professional-
ism." Id.
44. For example, Justice Rose's analogy is probably too modest. Intelligent laymen are
expected to grasp the theory of relativity when it is explained to them. See, e.g., G. Gamow,
MR. TOMPKINS IN PAPERBACK (1961) and I. Asimov, THE NEW INTELLIGENT MAN'S GUIDE TO
SCIENCE (1961) 1, 315-23 ("Relativity").
571
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On the other hand, a lay person cannot pretend to be a lawyer. Indeed, a lay
person cannot generally practice law even if prospective clients are fully
warned of his ignorance.
4 5
In addition to the right-to-counsel contention, opponents and support-
ers of lay judges have argued other points. Opponents of lay judges usually
claim a deprivation of equal protection. They argue that they would have
been tried by a lawyer judge if they had been charged with a different crime
or prosecuted in a different place. The courts have either rejected46 or failed
to reach47 this contention. Opponents of lay judges have also fruitlessly
advanced a straight due process argument, usually supporting it with tales of
the bizarre behavior of lay judges.48 At the same time, supporters of lay
judges have thrown the following counterpunches: Justices of the United
States Supreme Court are not required to be lawyers; 49 the Court, in all its
right-to-counsel cases, has never mentioned a right to a judge who was a
lawyer; 50 the Court has approved lay persons deciding some things; 51 and
finally, members of the legislative and executive branches are not required
to be lawyers.
52
All of these arguments are flawed. Those advanced by the opponents of
lay judges do not add to their basic right-to-counsel argument. The equal
protection point, which assumes the due process argument by maintaining
45. On this point, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), may be relevant. In Faretta
the United States Supreme Court held that an accused had a constitutional right to defend
himself at trial. Does the philosophy of Faretta support non-lawyer judges by reinforcing the
presumption that laymen can understand the law? Does Faretta cut the other way by emphasiz-
ing the importance of a judge who is learned in the law or does it perhaps turn on a theory akin
to assumption of risk?
46. See, e.g., Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772, 776-77 (Ky. 1972), appeal dismissed as
moot, 414 U.S. 885 (1973).
47. See, e.g., Gordon v. Justice Fourt for Yuba Judicial District of Sutter County, 12 Cal.
3d at 327 n.4, 525 P.2d at 74 n.4, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 634 n.4.
48. See, e.g., Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba City, 33 Cal. App. 3d 230 (opinion deleted),
108 Cal. Rptr. 912, 918 (1973), rev'd, 12 Cal.3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975). The "Petition for Alternative Writ of Prohibition and Mandate, for
Preemptory Writ of Prohibition and Writ of Mandate, and for Declaratory Relief" filed in
Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba City, Sutter County, No. 210521 (Super. Ct. Sacramento
County, Cal., filed Mar. 25, 1971), alleged inter alia in counts: 36(a) "Courtroom practice for
one non-attorney judge was to conduct an informal pol1 for the 'verdict' of the courtroom
audience prior to announcing his own decision in a case." Id. at 18; and 37(b) "One lay judge
stated that he always practiced 'sniffing' each witness from the bench because he believed he
could tell the witness's veracity by the witness's scent." Id. at 19.
49. See, e.g., Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba City, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
50. See, e.g., Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d at 774.
51. Those who made this argument usually relied on Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
489 (1972) (parolee entitled to revocation hearing before neutral and detached board whose
members need not be judges or lawyers), and Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972)
(lay clerks can issue warrants). See, e.g., Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba City, 108 Cal. Rptr.
at 921-22; Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d at 775; Thomas v. Justice Court of Washakie County,
538 P.2d at 50. A similar argument dwelt on the tradition of a lay jury in criminal cases.
52. See, e.g., Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba City, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
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that a lay judge differs significantly from a lawyer judge, simply persuades
the convinced. A straight due process argument simply restates the right-to-
counsel argument that lay judges are supposed to be per se unfair because of
their ignorance, and that, at most, their ignorance is due to an inability to
understand legal arguments.
The supplementary arguments advanced by the supporters of lay judges
are not so much syllogisms as they are debaters' points. Although Justices of
the Supreme Court are not required to be lawyers, the Constitution's silence
has been of no practical import during this century. The fact that the Court
had not mentioned a right to a lawyer judge was meaningless until it was
squarely faced with the issue. The Court's approval of lay persons to decide
some matters dealt with totally different circumstances.5 3 Finally, the legis-
lative and executive branches are irrelevant to the right-to-counsel argu-
ment.
54
The Strange Behavior of Appellate Courts
Courts confronting the constitutionality of lay judges generally have
acted peculiarly. Perhaps this strange behavior is prompted by the pragmat-
ic, political problems inherent in this area. For example, some courts appear
to have no stomach at all for this issue. The Tennessee Supreme Court
resolved to follow Gordon only to decide, over a strong dissent, that the
case was moot.55 The Court of Appeals of Tennessee followed this hint and
declared that juvenile-court judges had to be lawyers 56 but was reversed by
the Tennessee Supreme Court on the technical ground that the record did not
show that the judge in question was not a lawyer. 57 On the other hand, some
courts appear eager to reach the issue. The Indiana Supreme Court was
moved to issue a sua sponte opinion declaring unconstitutional an act
allowing lay judges.
58
The issue of lay judges has also produced widely varying solutions by
the various courts within a single state. For example, the three major cases
of Ditty, Gordon, and Shelmidine all reversed lower-court opinions.
59
Thus, great disagreement exists, not only among but within the states.
53. See note 51 supra.
54. Nevertheless, this point may show that non-lawyers can understand laws.
55. Perry v. Banks, 521 S.W.2d 549 (Sup. Ct. Tenn. 1975).
56. State v. Williams (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 1975).
57. State v. Williams (Tenn., NovT29, 1976).
58. In re Judicial Interpretation of 1975 Senate Enrolled Act No. 441, - Ind. -, 332
N.E.2d 97 (1975).
59. Hampton v. Ditty, No. 1049 (Harlan Circuit Ct., Ky., filed Aug. 18, 1972), rev'd sub
nom. Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1972), appeal dismissed as moot, 414 U.S. 885
(1973); Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba City, 33 Cal. App. 3d 230 (opinion deleted), 108 Cal.
Rptr. 912 (1973), rev'd, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 938 (1975); Shelmidine v. Jones, No. 224948 (3d Dist. Utah, filed June 8, 1975), rev'd, 550
P.2d 207 (Utah 1976).
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Such great diversity on a federal constitutional question should be
reconciled by the United States Supreme Court. Nevertheless, for a long
time it appeared as though the Court would not hear the issue. Ditty was
appealed to the Court but dismissed as moot when the appellant was fatally
knifed while in jail. 60 The Court denied certioriari in Gordon .61 Finally, the
Court was faced with the case of North v. Russell.
North was convicted in a Kentucky Police Court by a non-lawyer judge
for driving while intoxicated. He did not exercise his right under Kentucky
law to a trial de novo. Instead, North contended on appeal that his trial
before a non-lawyer judge violated his due process and equal protection
rights. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on the basis
of Ditty.62 North then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Before the Court noted probable jurisdiction, 63 it returned the case to
Kentucky on the suggestion of the Attorney General of Kentucky that
North's conviction could be reversed on state law grounds. 64 The Court of
Appeals of Kentucky, however, noted that North had appealed only on
federal grounds and complained that it found itself "performing an unwil-
ling and not altogether felicitous role in a judicial fan dance." 65 The
appellate court refused to decide errors which the appealing parties did not
complain of and sent the case back to the Supreme Court.
North v. Russell
Faced with a case that would not go away, the Supreme Court chose to
avoid the substantive issues. The Court first noted that the federal constitu-
tion did not expressly require that federal judges be lawyers. It also noted
the prevalence of lay magistrates in England and the existence in many
states of mandatory or voluntary training programs for lay judges. 66 The
relevance of these observations is never made clear. The latter seems
particularly inappropriate, as Mr. Justice Stewart remarked in his dissent:
"Judge Russell testified that he had only a high school education ....
This is not a case, therefore, involving a lay judge who has received the kind
of special training that several States apparently provide. "
67
The Court briefly described the right-to-counsel argument and then
stated that it was irrelevant because defendants had a right to a trial de novo
60. 414 U.S. 885 (1973).
61. 420 U.S. 938 (1975).
62. 427 U.S. at 332.
63. 422 U.S. 1040 (1975).
64. 419 U.S. 1085 (1974).
65. North v. Russell, 540 S.W.2d 4. 5 (Ky. 1975).
66. 427 U.S. at 333 n.4.
67. Id. at 340 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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before a lawyer judge. 68 For this argument to hold together, the Court had to
overcome three obstacles: first, whether defendants know that they have a
right to a trial de novo; second, whether trial de novo sufficiently remedies
an unfair trial; and third, whether trial de novo unfairly burdens the defense.
The Court met any doubts about defendants' knowing that they could
receive a trial de novo by simply assuming that judges would "recognize
their obligation to inform all convicted defendants . . .of their uncondi-
tional right to a trial de novo. . "69 The second obstacle, however,
raised more complex questions and deserves a more lengthy analysis.
The argument against trial de novo as a remedy for an unfair trial is that
a defendant deserves a fair hearing at his first trial. This argument was well
supported by Ward v. Village of Monroeville. 70 In Ward the Court had held
that trials conducted in an Ohio Mayor's Court were unfair because of
financial temptations on the judge to convict. 71 The state argued that any
unfairness was alleviated by a subsequent trial de novo. The Court re-
sponded:
We disagree. This "procedural safeguard" does not guaran-
tee a fair trial in the mayor's court; there is nothing to suggest that
the incentive to convict would be diminished by the possibility of
reversal on appeal. Nor, in any event, may the State's trial court
procedure be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because
the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial adjudication.
Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first
instance .72
Does this language require that a defendant's first trial contain all the
relevant due process safeguards? Apparently not, for in North the Court
distinguished Ward as "directed at the need for independent, neutral, and
detached judgment, not at legal training."73 Two questions must be asked
about the Court's treatment of Ward: (1) how is the discussion relevant; and
(2) is the distinction correct?
First, at least on the surface, the Ward discussion seems to contradict
the tenor of the Court's opinion. Since Ward is relevant only if a reasonable
possibility existed that the first trial was unfair, the Court may be assuming
what it purported not to decide-that trials before non-lawyer judges are
68. Id. at 334.
69. Id. at 335.
70. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
71. Id. at 60. The judge, who was also mayor of Monroeville, personally received neither
fees nor fines. Nevertheless, because fees and fines were a substantial percentage of the
village's revenues, the Court held that a mayor responsible for these revenues was tempted to
convict.
72. Id. at 61-62. The quoted paragraph is the Court's entire analysis on this point.
73. 427 U.S. at 337.
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indeed unfair. Even if this analysis did not run through the Court's mind, the
Court has piled hypothesis upon conjecture to reach its decision.
Second, the Court never addressed the point made by Mr. Justice
Stewart in dissent that "there can be no meaningful constitutional difference
between a trial that is fundamentally unfair because of the judge's possible
bias, and one that is fundamentally unfair because of the judge's ignorance
of the law."- 74 Unless the Court's answer can be deciphered from other
language in the opinion, this attack remains unrefuted.
Of course, on narrow technical grounds, the Court is correct. Ward
dealt with interest, not ignorance. Indeed, both of the tests that can be
derived from Ward (no lessening of incentive to convict and the right to a
neutral and detached judge in the first instance) were phrased to combat
bias. Nevertheless, the spirit of Ward runs against the Court's distinction.
From the defendant's perspective, Justice Stewart is surely right that it
makes little difference to one found guilty whether he was convicted out of
interest or ignorance.
Perhaps the Court's distinction can be salvaged, or at least made
palatable, by shifting Ward's focus from the defendant to the judge. If bias
is evil, while ignorance is less vicious, then Ward can be justified as an
attempt to maintain the dignity of the judiciary, rather than as a personal
right of the defendant. Still, this shift is disturbing, primarily because Ward
did not allude to the dignity of the judiciary. Further, it would seem strange
to argue that the dignity of the judiciary is not harmed by ignorant judges.
The third and final obstacle, whether trial de novo unfairly burdens the
defense, was addressed by the Court two days after North in Ludwig v.
Massachusetts .
THE LAY JUDGE AFTER NORTH
The Return of Trial De Novo
Ludwig is a necessary support for North because, in Ludwig, trial de
novo was attacked as unconstitutional. Ludwig had been accused of a
driving violation and was given a bench trial in a court of limited juris-
diction. He combined his fifth and sixth amendment rights to claim a right to
a speedy jury trial. The Court, noting Ludwig's absolute right to a jury on
trial de novo in the court of general jurisdiction, indicated that he had not
proved that he would have received a jury trial any earlier were there only a
single trial court in the state. Consequently, the Court rejected Ludwig's
constitutional claim. Although this narrow conclusion seems correct, given
74. Id. at 345.
75. 427 U.S. 618 (1976).
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the absence of proof on this issue, the Court was on less stable ground in
attempting to justify the policy of trial de novo. Here Mr. Justice Stevens'
dissent is persuasive.
Justice Stevens argued that a trial de novo was fundamentally defective
and had adverse effects on the defendant. The trial was defective because it
was affected by what had happened at the first trial. For example, lawyers
and witnesses might be stale at the second trial; tactics might be disclosed;
opportunities for impeachment might be lost. Further, the trier of fact could
always consider, subconsciously or knowingly, that a defendant already had
been found guilty. In addition, being found guilty at the first trial could
damage the defendant's reputation. Finally, the defendant might be unable
to withstand the financial and psychological burdens of a second trial.
Despite Justice Stevens' policy arguments, it is probable that courts
will seize upon trial de novo as the only clear guidepost in North. Three
courts have already done so. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in a
unanimous decision,76 and the Supreme Court of Washington, in a five to
four decision, 77 did little more than cite North, note that their states offered
defendants a trial de novo, and deduce that their lay judges were constitu-
tional.78 The Supreme Court of Vermont went the other way by noting that
the state did not offer a trial de novo after a defendant was tried by a three-
judge panel of two lay "side" judges and one lawyer judge.79
Two courts have broken this trend. The Supreme Court of Arizona,
faced with an interesting variant of the normal claim, ignored the trial de
novo guidepost. 80 Arizona does not give defendants a trial de novo. The
defendant was convicted by a lay judge, and, based on North, claimed a
right to a de novo trial. The court denied his petition, arguing that a review
of the trial transcript by a lawyer judge was sufficient. Similarly, the Court
of Appeals of New York held that a pre-trial removal from a non-lawyer to a
lawyer judge is a sufficient safeguard. 8'
76. Jenkins v. Canaan Mun. Court, 116 N.H. 616, 366 A.2d 208 (1976).
77. Young v. Konz, 88 Wash. 2d 276, 558 P.2d 791 (1977). The dissent would have adopted
Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent in North.
78. The court in Young also discounted the distinction that Washington, unlike Kentucky,
did not give defendants who pled guilty a right to trial de novo. Id. at -, 558 P.2d at 794.
79. State v. Dunkerley, 134 Vt. 523. 365 A.2d 131 (1976). In Vermont, cases were tried by
a panel of three judges: one lawyer and two lay persons, the side judges. Each judge voted on
both fact and law. The Supreme Court of Vermont, noting that the lay judges could outvote the
lawyer judge on issues of law, concluded that defendants were, in effect, being tried by lay
persons. Since Vermont did not have trial de novo, the court, citing North, held that the lay
judges could no longer vote on legal issues. Id. at -, 365 A.2d at 132. For a description of a
European side-judge system, see Casper & Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts,
I J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1972).
80. Palmer v. Superior Court of Ariz., 114 Ariz. 279, 560 P.2d 797 (1977).
81. People v. Skyrnski, - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1977).
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Nevertheless, if Washington, New Hampshire, and Vermont indicate
the trend, then courts are going to seize upon trial de novo as the essence of
North. If this surmise is accurate, several questions are worth asking: (1) is
trial de novo a good guidepost; and (2) is trial de novo a good idea?
First, trial de novo only works as a one-way guidepost. A state which
offers convicted defendants a trial de novo is assured that its lay judges are
constitutional.82 On the other hand, a state without trial de novo cannot be
certain if its lay judges are constitutional. This problem is not merely
theoretical because some states that have lay judges do not have trial de
novo.8 3 Courts in these states could logically divine opposite conclusions
from North. A court could note the emphasis the Court placed on a
defendant's actual knowledge that he had a new trial available and thus
conclude that this emphasis meant trial de novo was crucial to the constitu-
tionality of lay judges. On the other hand, it would be equally logical for a
court to note that the Supreme Court actually allowed lay judges to preside
at trials and thereby conclude that lay judges must be constitutional.
Using trial de novo as a guidepost also means that the issue of lay
judges need never be squarely faced. Whether that consequence is desirable
or not depends on one's philosophy and perspective. Still, use of the trial de
novo guidepost does shift the inquiry from the constitutionality and wisdom
of having lay judges to the constitutionality and wisdom of trial de novo.
At least one half of this latter inquiry is answered by Ludwig.
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens' dissent in Ludwig does point to serious flaws
in a system relying on trial de novo. Here the Supreme Court is like the
Wizard in the movie "The Wizard of Oz." When Dorothy, the Scarecrow,
the Cowardly Lion, and the Tin Woodsman return after having killed the
Wicked Witch, they each ask the Wizard for something. "I can't give you a
brain," the Wizard says to the Scarecrow, "but I can give you something
almost as good." And so saying, he gives the Scarecrow a diploma.
Certify, Certify
In North, the Court mentioned in passing that some states provide
training programs for lay judges. Indeed, it is now generally accepted that
82. Nevertheless, there may be state constitutional grounds for declaring lay judges
unconstitutional. See, e.g., State v. Williams (Tenn., Nov. 29, 1976) n.j. Still, state ground may
be difficult to apply: if lay judges are expressly permitted by the state's constitution, then
courts may be bound by the canon of construing a constitution so no part overrules another. See
Gordon v. Justice Court of Yuba City, 33 Cal. App. 3d at -, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
83. E.g., Arizona, Palmer v. Superior Court of Ariz., 114 Ariz. 279, 560 P.2d 797 (1977);
Florida, Treiman v. State ex rel. Miner, 343 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1977); New York, People v.
Skrynski, - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -,- N.Y.S.2d- (1977); In re Hewitt, 81 Misc. 2d 202, 365
N.Y.S.2d 760 (Tompkins County Ct. 1975); Vermont, State v. Dunkerley, 134 Vt. 523, 365 A.2d
131 (1976).
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continuing training and education for all judges, and in particular for lay
judges, is essential to a competent judiciary. Along with requiring their
judges to attend a judicial conference, many states have additional education
requirements for their judiciary.8 4 Sometimes, the additional requirement is
a single training or orientation session held either prior to or immediately
after the judges assume the bench. In a few instances, judges of courts of
limited jurisdiction are required to attend training sessions on a regular
basis.85 Twenty states now have some form of mandatory training for their
non-lawyer judges beyond attendance at a judicial conference.
86
The Supreme Court in North really did not develop this theme of
education. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida has recently decided
that an education program could overcome the deficiencies of lay judges.
87
Similarly, Idaho instituted certification of its lay magistrates after Gordon in
the hope that such a program will save its system despite the lack of trial de
novo.
88
Certification does have the virtue of meeting the right-to-counsel argu-
ment head on by asserting that a lay judge is indeed qualified to understand
legal arguments. Nevertheless, this argument may involve the courts in
difficult areas of line-drawing. For example, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia rejected a certification argument in Gordon, noting that the certifying
examination was "far less rigorous than the two-and-one-half days State Bar
examination required of one seeking to become an attorney.8 9 Thus, courts
adopting this argument will have to decide whether the Wizard was correct
in asserting that a diploma was almost as good as a brain.
CONCLUSION
The debate over lay judges continues. Little has been done of late either
to put this debate to rest or to address the true issues. Much heat has been
generated by courts and commentators, but, unfortunat.ely, little light.
Recent developments in the subject of lay judges prove that the area is
treacherous and the route uncertain.
In North and Ludwig, the United States Supreme Court had an oppor-
tunity either to abolish lay judges and trial de novo or to place them on a
sound constitutional footing. Rather than avail itself of this opportunity, the
84. See B. Franklin, STATE JUDICIAL TRAINING PROFILE 10 (National Center for State
Courts, 1976).
85. Id.
86. See Appendix. An asterisk indicates a court requiring training beyond attendance at a
judicial conference.
87. Treiman v. State ex rel. Miner, 343 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1977).
88. See Schulert, Idaho Moves to Certify Nonlawyer Magistrates, 60 JUD. 455 (1977).
89. 12 Cal. 3d at 329-30, 525 P.2d at 76, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
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Court abdicated its responsibility. Nevertheless, discussion on these sub-
jects is not foreclosed. By the Court's reluctance to meet these subjects
squarely, the issue of lay justice and trial de novo will undoubtedly be faced
by state courts in the future. Unfortunately, in the absence of Supreme Court




Table A lists those states in which all judges must be lawyers. Tables B,
C, and D list those courts in which some or all judges can be lay persons.
Table B contains courts which have lay judges only through grandfather
clauses; Table C contains courts which have lay judges only in restricted
areas or under specific circumstances; and Table D contains courts which
allow lay judges under most or all circumstances. Because a state may have
courts appearing in more than one table, an index has been provided.
Tables B, C, and D also describe the most important jurisdictions
exercised by these judges. Certain powers common to most courts have
been omitted, e.g., issuing all necessary writs, punishing contempt, and
performing marriages. Jurisdiction is original unless otherwise noted. No
distinction is made between exclusive original and concurrent original. In
discussing dollar limits on jurisdiction, the word "under" has been used
indiscriminately to mean both "up to, but not including" and "not in excess
of." Venue provisions have been omitted, as have geographic limits on
jurisdiction. An asterisk indicates a court requiring judicial training beyond
attendance at a judicial conference. See generally B. FRANKLIN, STATE
JUDICIAL TRAINING PROFILE (National Center for State Courts, 1976).
For information provided in parentheticals relating to qualifications,
see Judicial Qualifications-Statutory Requirements: A National Survey
(American Judicature Society, 1976) (unpublished).
A reader desiring an additional description of these courts should con-
sult LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, COURTS OF LIMITED
JURISDICTION: A NATIONAL SURVEY (K. Knab ed. 1977).
TABLE A
STATES WITH No LAY JUDGES
District of Columbia
Hawaii





COURTS WITH LAY JUDGES ONLY THROUGH GRANDFATHER CLAUSES
California
Justice Court
Civil Jurisdiction: (1) All cases at law under $5,000, except cases
contesting: (a) title to or possession of realty, or (b) the legality of any
tax, impost, assessment, toll or municipal fine; (2) all actions of
forcible entry and detainer with a rental value of under $600 per
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month and damages of under $5,000; and (3) all actions to enforce
liens under $5,000 on personalty. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 86 (West
Supp. 1977).
Small-claims Jurisdiction: Under $750. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 116-
.2 (West Supp. 1977).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors; ordinance violations; arrest
warrants; preliminary hearings. CAL. PENAL CODE § 807 (West 1970),
§§ 859, 1462 (West Supp. 1977).
Florida
County Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions at law under $2,500 except those within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court; landlord-tenant cases under
$2,500. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 20(c)(4); FLA. STAT. § 34.011 (Supp.
1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors not within the jurisdiction of the
circuit court; county and municipal ordinance violations; preliminary
hearings. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 20(c)(4).
Georgia
Probate Court (counties with more than 196,000 residents)
Civil Jurisdiction: Probate; appointment of guardians; permits to car-
ry pistols or revolvers. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1804 (Supp. 1976), -1901
(1971), § 26-2904 (Supp. 1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanor violations of Georgia State High-
way Patrol Act of 1937; fish and game law violations; habeas corpus,
except in felony or extradition cases. GA. CONST. § 2-4102; GA. CODE
ANN. § 45-547 (1974), § 50-103 (1965).
Illinois
Associate Circuit Judges
Jurisdiction: Associate judges have the full jurisdiction of the circuit
court. The chief judge of the circuit court may assign an associate
judge to hear any matter except the trial of criminal cases in which
the defendant is charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year. Nevertheless, upon a showing of need, the
supreme court may authorize the chief judge to make temporary
assignments of associate judges to hear any criminal case. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. I10A, § 295 (1975) (Sup. Ct. R. 295).
Michigan
Probate Court
Jurisdiction: Probate; validity of title to property when ancillary to
the settlement of an estate; appointment of guardians; juvenile delin-
quents and dependents. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 701.19 (Supp.
1977).
Municipal Court not of Record (being replaced by District Court)
Civil Jurisdiction: Cases in which both parties are city residents.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 730.5, .508 (1968).
Small-claims Jurisdiction: Under $100. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
730.508, .530 (1968).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors punishable by fine or by impri-





Civil Jurisdiction: Actions at law under $5,000 and not involving title
to realty; probate; trusts; quieting title to realty; realty foreclosures;
divorce; adoption; guardianship; delinquency. MINN. STAT. §§
487.14, .15, .17, .19 (1974).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors punishable by fine under $300
and/or three months in jail; municipal ordinances and regulations;
preliminary hearings. MINN. STAT. § 487.18 (1974).
Justice Courts (being replaced by Traffic Violations Bureau)
Civil Jurisdiction: Uncontested cases. MINN. STAT. § 487.35(d) (1974).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Guilty pleas in ordinance or traffic cases; no
power to jail; no preliminary hearings; only lawyers can issue war-
rants. MINN. STAT. § 487.35 (1974).
Missouri
Probate Court (until January 1979)
Jurisdiction: Probate; guardians. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 16 (1945).
Magistrate's Court (until January 1979)
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions under $5,000; actions against railroads for
damage to animals; possessory actions between landlord and tenant.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 482.090 (Vernon Supp. 1977), § 524.020 (1949).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors, except as otherwise provided
by law. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 543.010 (Vernon Supp. 1977).
New Hampshire
Municipal Court* (being replaced with District Court)
Civil Jurisdiction: Cases under $500;, juvenile cases. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 169:2, 503:3a, :1 (Supp. 1975), § 169:29 (1964).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Crimes punishable by fine under $1,000 and/or
one year in jail; preliminary hearings; warrants. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 502.18 (Supp. 1975), §§ 592-A:1, :4, :8 (1974).
New Jersey
Municipal Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Contract cases under $100. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:8-24 (West 1952).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Ordinances violations; motor vehicle viola-
tions; offenses below grade of misdemeanor; preliminary hearings.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:8-21, 8-23 (West 1952).
Ohio
County Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Cases under $500 including replevin and actions
involving realty, except where title is involved. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 1909.04, .05, .08, .09, .10 (Page 1968).
Small-claims Jurisdiction: Under $300. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1925.02 (Page Supp. 1974).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Motor-vehicle violations; misdemeanors;
search warrants. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1907.02 (Page 1968), §§
2931.02, 2933.21 (Page 1975).
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Oregon
Justice Court* (being replaced by District Court)
Civil Jurisdiction: Cases under $1,000. OR. REV. STAT. § 51.080
(1975).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors punishable by fine under $100
and three months in jail or by fine under $500 and one year in jail,
depending on the county. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 51.040, .050, .060 (1975).
Virginia
District Court
Civil Jurisdiction : Cases under $5,000; insanity hearings. VA. CODE §§
16.1-77, -69.28 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors; county ordinances; city ordi-
nances if no city court; preliminary hearings. VA. CODE §§ 16.1-123,
-127 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction: Juvenile cases; commitment of mentally defective chil-
dren; adults charged with crimes, other than murder and manslaugh-
ter, against children. VA. CODE § 16.1-158 (Supp. 1976).
TABLE C
COURTS WITH LAY JUDGES ONLY IN CERTAIN AREAS OR UNDER SPECIFIC
CIRCUMSTANCES
Alaska
District Court Magistrates (less-populous areas)
Civil Jurisdiction: Cases under $1,000. ALASKA STAT. § 22.15.120
(1962).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Ordinance violations; misdemeanors if defend-
ant consents. ALASKA STAT. § 22.15.120 (1962).
Florida
County Court (counties with fewer than 40,000 residents)
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions at law under $2,500, except those within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit court; landlord-tenant cases
under $2,500. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 20(c)(4); FLA. STAT. § 34.011
(Supp. 1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors not within the jurisdiction of the
circuit court; county and municipal ordinances; preliminary hearings.
FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 20(c)(4).
Georgia
Probate Court (counties with fewer than 196,000 residents)
Civil Jurisdiction: Probate; appointment of guardians; permits to car-
ry pistols or revolvers. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1901 (1971), § 26-2904
(Supp. 1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanor violations of Georgia State High-
way Patrol Act of 1937; fish and game law violations; habeas corpus,
except in felony or extradition cases. GA. CONST. § 2-4102; GA. CODE
ANN. § 45-547 (1974), § 50-103 (1956).
Local Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
Note: Qualifications and jurisdiction have never been codified.
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Iowa
District Court part-time judicial magistrates* (preference given to attor-
neys)
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions under $3,000; forcible entry and detainer
not involving title; juvenile cases with the permission of the chief
judge. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 602.60, 644.2, .12, 748.2 (West 1975).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Simple misdemeanors; traffic and ordinance
violations; preliminary hearings; search warrants. IOWA CODE ANN. §
602.60 (West 1975), as amended by 1976 Iowa Acts, ch. 4, § 488
(effective Jan. 1, 1978).
Kentucky
Trial Commissioners for Inferior Courts (only if no attorney is available)
Jurisdiction: Such judicial duties as assigned by the judge; issue war-
rants with the permission of the County Court. Ky. REV. STAT. §
25.038(2) (Supp. 1976).
Mississippi
Municipal Court (fewer than 10,000 residents or more than 10,000 resi-
dents in an area greater than 935 square miles)
Jurisdiction: Municipal ordinances; preliminary hearings. Miss. CODE
ANN. § 21-23-7 (Supp. 1976).
Missouri
Municipal Court (fewer than 40,000 residents unless municipality does not
provide or does not request an association circuit judge-effective
January 1979)
Jurisdiction: Ordinance violations; traffic cases. Mo. CONST. art. 5,
§§ 23, 25; SUPREME COURT RULES 37.01-37.115.
New Mexico
Magistrate's Court* (fewer than 100,000 residents)
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions under $2,000. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 36-3-3
(Supp. 1975).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors; preliminary hearings; bail; war-
rants; contempt. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3-4, -9, 36-23-10, -12, -13,
-15, -17, -31, -34 (Supp. 1975).
North Dakota
County Justice Court (if no attorney available)
Civil Jurisdiction: Cases under $200 excluding cases involving real
estate titles and boundaries. N.D. CENT. CODE § 33-01-04 (1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors; preliminary hearings; war-
rants; bail. N.D. CENT. CODE § 33-01-08 (1976).
Municipal Court (more than 3,000 residents if no attorney is available)
Jurisdiction: Municipal ordinance violations. N.D. CONST. art. 4, §
113; N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-01 (Supp. 1975).
Oklahoma
Special District Judge (if no attorney available)
Civil Jurisdiction: Cases under $400. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 123
(West Supp. 1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Consent of all parties; misdemeanors punish-
able by small fines and/or 30 days in jail. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §
123 (West Supp. 1976).
Municipal Court not of Record (fewer than 7,500 residents or no attorney
available)
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Jurisdiction: City ordinances; supervise juveniles on probation, on
parole, or with suspended sentences; lay judges cannot jail and




Jurisdiction: Probate; appointment of guardians; sale and partition of
land; juvenile cases in some counties. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-709
(Supp. 1976), § 37-202(8) (1977).
Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction: Juvenile cases; paternity suits; contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor. TENN. CODE-ANN. §§ 37-203, -204, -254 (1977).
Court of General Sessions (the 33 districts with the fewest residents)
Civil Jurisdiction: Same as Justice of the Peace Court; injunctive
relief; probate in certain counties; juvenile cases in certain counties.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-1104 (Supp. 1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: "Small offenses" punishable by a $50 fine;
revoke and suspend sentences; preliminary hearings. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 16-1104 (Supp. 1976), §§ 40-304, -408, -416 (1975).
City Courts (except in cities incorporated under TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-30
to -36 (1971))
Jurisdiction: City ordinances punishable by $50 fine or 30 days in jail;
guilty pleas; warrants; bail; such jurisdiction as granted by the city
council. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2119, -2120, -2122, -3303 (1971).
Texas
County Courts-at-Law (qualifications vary)
Jurisdiction: Since these courts are created to relieve the constitution-
al county court of its judicial burden, jurisdiction varies widely.
Some county courts-at-law have jurisdiction limited to a specific
subject, such as probate. A 1971 act gave all county courts-at-law
civil jurisdiction over cases in which the amount in controversy was
greater than $500 and less than $5,000. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1970(a) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
Juvenile Court (qualifications vary)
Jurisdiction: Provided by the statutes creating these courts; generally
limited to domestic relations or juvenile cases. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. arts. 2338-3 to -23 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
Municipal Court (qualifications vary)
Jurisdiction: City ordinances; misdemeanors punishable by a $200
fine. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1195 (Vernon 1963). The Texas
Judicial Council estimates that 84% of the cases filed in municipal
courts involve traffic offenses.
Washington
Justice Court (fewer than 10,000 residents)
Civil Jurisdiction: Cases under $1,000 excluding cases involving real-
ty. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 3.66.020 (Supp. 1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: City ordinances punishable by a fine of $500 or
six months in jail; misdemeanors; gross misdemeanors. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 3.66.060 (Supp. 1976).
Justice of the Peace Courts* (fewer than 5,000 residents)
Civil Jurisdiction: If lawyer, in cases under $1,000; if non-lawyer, in
cases under $500. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 3.20.020 (Supp. 1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors pun-
NON-LAWYER JUDGES
ishable, in first-class counties, by a $500 fine or six months in jail and
punishable, in all other counties, by a $100 fine or 30 days in jail.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 3.20.040 (1961).
Municipal Courts (fewer than 5,000 residents)
Jurisdiction: Municipal ordinances punishable by a fine of $500 or
less, or imprisonment not more than six months, or both; warrants
and bail in some cities; jurisdiction concurrent with superior court in
large cities. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.20.030 (1965), §§ 35.20.250,
.255 (Supp. 1976), § 35A.20.040 (Supp. 1977), §§ 3.46.030, 3.50.020,
.160, .210 (Supp. 1976).
Wyoming
Justice Court* (if no attorney available)
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions under $1,000. WYO. STAT. § 5-91 (1957),
1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 214, § 25 (effective Jan. 1, 1975).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Offenses below felonies punishable by a $100
fine or six months in jail (higher if a violation of a fish or game law);
arrest warrants. WYO. STAT. § 7-409 (Cum. Supp. 1973), § 7-413
(1957).
TABLE D
COURTS WITH No RESTRICTIONS ON LAY JUDGES
Alabama
Probate Court
Jurisdiction: Probate; appointment of guardians; partition of realty.
ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 278 (1959).
Arizona
Justice Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Cases under $1,000; forcible entry and detainer;
landlord-tenant. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 22-201 (Supp. 1977).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Petty theft; assault and battery committed
neither on a public officer discharging his duties nor with felonious
intent; breach of the peace; willful injury to property; misdemeanors
and criminal offenses punishable by a $300 fine and/or six months in
jail; arrest warrants; preliminary hearings. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 22-
301, -311 (1956).
City Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions by the city to recover a penalty or forfei-
ture. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 22-406 (1956).
Criminal Jurisdiction: City ordinances; concurrent jurisdiction with
the Justice Court; bail; bail schedule for non-fatal traffic offenses.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 22-402, -424 (1956).
Arkansas
County Court
Jurisdiction: The County Court spends most of its time on administra-
tive or legislative duties: it controls county taxes, the spending of
county funds, and the payment of claims against the county. The
County Court also hears cases concerned with the internal im-
provement and local concerns of the county. ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 28.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: Civil cases not involving title to realty. Jurisdictional
limits range from $500 to $1,500 and are set by the local acts establish-
ing the court. See Compiler's Note following ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-
615 (1962 & Supp. 1975).
Municipal Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions for contract under $300; actions for per-
sonal injury, and personal property up to $500. No jurisdiction when
possession of or title to land is involved. ARK. CONST. art. 7, §§ 40, 43
("Corporation Courts"); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-709, -712 (1962);
United Loan & Investment Co. v. Chilton, 225 Ark. 1037, 287 S.W.2d
458 (1956).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Municipal ordinances; misdemeanors; prelimi-
nary hearings. ARK. CONST. art. 7, §§ 40, 43; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-
709 (1962); Lee v. Watts, 243 Ark. 957, 423 S.W.2d 557 (1968).
Justice of the Peace Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Contract actions under $300; recovery of property
under $300; damage to personalty under $100; no jurisdiction where a
lien on, title to, or possession of land is involved. ARK. CONST. art. 7,
§ 40.
Criminal Jurisdiction: Offenses below felony; preliminary hearings.
ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 40; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1405 (1964).
City (Mayor's) Courts
Civil Jurisdiction: Same as Justice of the Peace Court. ARK. CONST.
art. 7, §§ 1, 43; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1102 (second-class cities),
-1204 (1968) (towns), § 43-1405 (1964).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Same as Justice of the Peace Court plus ordi-
nances. ARK. CONST. art. 7, §§ 1, 43; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1102
(second-class cities), -1204 (1968) (towns), § 43-1405 (1964).
Police Courts
Civil Jurisdiction: Same as Justice of the Peace Court. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 22-809 (1962).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Same as Justice of the Peace Court plus ordi-
nances. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-809 (1962).
Colorado
County Court*
Civil Jurisdiction: Civil actions under $1,000; forcible entry and de-
tainer under $1,000 not involving boundaries or titleto realty. Except
where specifically authorized, no jurisdiction over probate, mental
health cases, title to realty, divorce, juvenile cases, injunctions.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-104 (Supp. 1976), § 13-6-105 (1973).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors except those involving minors;
warrants; preliminary hearings; bail. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-6-106
(1973). The bulk of the County Courts' caseloads are traffic viola-
tions.
Municipal Court
Jurisdiction: Ordinances. COLO. REV. STAT. § 3-10-104 (1973). Most
of the cases are traffic violations.
Connecticut
Probate Court




Civil Jurisdiction: Cases in contract, trespass, replevin, detinue, for-
cible entry and detainer under $1,500. DEL. CODE tit. 10, §§ 9301,
9303, 9304, 9305 (1974).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Minor misdemeanors; motor vehicle cases ex-
cluding felonies; preliminary hearings. No criminal jurisdiction in
Wilmington. DEL. CODE tit. 11, §§ 2701, 2702 (Supp. 1976), §§ 5710,
5909 (1974).
Alderman's or Mayor's Court
Jurisdiction: Municipal ordinances; warrants; no preliminary hear-
ings. DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 5705 (1974).
Georgia
Justice of the Peace Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Breach of contract; damage to or recovery of per-
sonal property; forcible entry and detainer, all under $200. GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-1001 (1971).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Warrants; preliminary hearings. GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-1501 (1971).
Idaho
District Court Magistrates*
Civil Jurisdiction: Action for money damages under $1,000; forcible
entry and detainer; probate; juvenile proceedings (only magistrates
who are attorneys may hear child-custody cases); such matters as
assigned by supreme court rule. IDAHO CODE §§ 1-2208, -2210 (Supp.
1976).
Small-claims Jurisdiction: Under $500. IDAHO CODE § 1-2301 (Supp.
1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors; quasi-criminal actions; war-
rants; preliminary hearings; bail. IDAHO CODE § 1-2208 (Supp. 1976).
Kansas
District Court Magistrate
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions under $2,000, except recovery of property;
probate; juvenile cases. KAN. STAT. § 20-302(b) (Supp. 1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors; preliminary hearings. KAN.
STAT. § 20-302(b) (Supp. 1976).
Louisiana
Justice of the Peace Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions under $300; no jurisdiction in probate nor
when a successor is defendant nor when the state or political subdivi-
sion is defendant nor when title to realty is involved. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13:2584(A), (B) (West Supp. 1977).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Power to bail or discharge in cases punishable
neither by death nor by hard labor (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:2584(C)
(West Supp. 1977)); search warrants in theft cases; arrest warrants.
LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. arts. 161, 202 (West 1966).
Mayor's Court
Jurisdiction: Ordinances punishable by a $200 fine and 30 days in jail;
drunk driving punishable by a $500 fine and 60 days in jail. LA. REV.




Jurisdiction: Judicial, but not administrative, probate; appoint guar-
dians for minors and disabled persons. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. §§ 2-102, 13-105 (1974).
Mississippi
Justice of the Peace Court*
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions under $200 for the recovery of debts, dam-
ages or personalty. MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 171; Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-
11-9 (1972).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Crimes punishable by a fine and imprisonment




Civil Jurisdiction: Contract and damage actions under $1,500. MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 93-408 (Supp. 1975).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Assaults; thefts under $150; misdemeanors
punishable by a $500 fine or six months in jail. MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 93-410 (Supp. 1975).
City Court
Jurisdiction: Same as Justice Court plus ordinances and preliminary
hearings. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-1602 (Supp. 1975), §§ 11-
1603, -1702 (1968).
Nebraska
Associate County Court Judges*
Civil Jurisdiction: Probate; guardianship; adoption; actions under
$5,000; juvenile cases in counties without juvenile courts. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 24-517 (1975), § 43-202 (1974).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Crimes punishable by a $1,000 fine and/or one




Civil Jurisdiction: Prescribed proceedings under $300. NEV. CONST.
art. 6, § 8; NEV. REV. STAT. § 4.370 (Supp. 1973).
Small-claims Jurisdiction: Recovery of under $300. NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 73.010 (Supp. 1973).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors punishable by a $500 fine and/or
six months in jail; petit larceny; assault and battery; breach of the
peace; willful injury to property. NEV. REV. STAT. § 4.370 (Supp.
1973).
Municipal Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions under $300 to which the city is a party.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 266.555 (Supp. 1973). Municipal Courts in "char-
ter cities" have such civil jurisdiction as may be provided by the city
charter.
Criminal Jurisdiction: Ordinances including vagrancy and disorderly
conduct; misdemeanors punishable by a $500 fine or six months in




Jurisdiction: These judges are essentially bonded probate-officers of
the County Court. They are only authorized to admit routine, uncon-
tested wills to probate. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:5-1, 5-2 (West 1952).
New Mexico
Probate Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Probate. The state constitution authorizes the legis-
lature to grant probate courts jurisdiction over actions under $3,000
but the legislature has not yet done so. N.M. CONST. art. 6, § 23;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-10 (Supp. 1975).
Criminal Jurisdiction: The state constitution authorizes the legislature
to grant misdemeanor jurisdiction to the probate court but the legisla-
ture has not done so. N.M. CONST. art. 6, § 23.
Municipal Court*
Jurisdiction: Municipal ordinances punishable by a $300 fine and/or
90 days in jail; warrants. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-2 (Supp. 1975), §
38-1-3 (1972).
New York
Town or Village Court*
Civil Jurisdiction: Action under $2,000; all summary landlord-tenant
cases. N.Y. UNIFORM JUSTICE CT. ACT §§ 201-214 (McKinney Supp.
1977).
Small-claims Jurisdiction: Under $500. N.Y. UNIFORM JUSTICE CT.
ACT §§ 1801-1812 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
Criminal Jurisdiction: All offenses under felonies; preliminary hear-
ings. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 10.10, .30 (McKinney 1971); N.Y.
UNIFORM JUSTICE CT. ACT § 2001 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
North Carolina
District Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions under $5,000; divorce; custody and child
support; juvenile cases. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-243, -244 (1969), §§
7A-246, -277 (Supp. 1975).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors; preliminary hearings; war-
rants; bail. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-272 (1969), § 7A-291 (Supp. 1975).
District Court Magistrates*
Jurisdiction: Civil cases under $500 upon plaintiff's request; war-
rants; preliminary hearings; worthless check cases; guilty pleas for
misdemeanors punishable by a $50 fine or 30 days in jail. N.C.




Jurisdiction: Probate; appointment of guardians. N.D. CONST. art. 4,
§ Il l; N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-07-02 (Supp. 1975).
Ohio
Mayor's Court
Jurisdiction: Municipal ordinances; traffic offenses. OHIO REV. CODE





Jurisdiction: Municipal ordinances; traffic offenses except felonies;
state liquor-control laws. OR. REV. STAT. § 221.350, 471.990,484.030
(1975).
County Court
Jurisdiction: Some juvenile and probate cases. OR. REV. STAT. § 5.020
(Supp. 1969), § 111.055 (Supp. 1973).
Pennsylvania
Justice of the Peace Court (District Judge)*
Civil Jurisdiction: Cases under $1,000 in contract and trespass. 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1515(3) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Summary offenses, except those within juris-
diction of traffic court. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1515(1) (Purdon
Supp. 1977).
Philadelphia Traffic Court*
Jurisdiction: Summary vehicular offenses. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1302, 1321 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
South Carolina
Probate Court
Jurisdiction: Probate; appointment of guardians; mental incompeten-
cy hearings. S.C. CODE § 14-23-580 (Supp. 1977).
Magistrate's Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Cases under $500. S.C. CODE § 22-3-10 (Supp.
1977).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Only in counties without county courts;
"minor" offenses punishable by a $100 fine or 30 days in jail; prelimi-
nary hearings; warrants; bail. S.C. CODE §§ 22-3-510, -540 to -590,
-710 (1976).
Municipal Courts
Jurisdiction: Municipal ordinances; warrants. In some cities, the re-
corder is authorized to suspend sentences. S.C. CODE §§ 14-25-50,
-970, -980, -990 (1976).
South Dakota
Lay Magistrates*
Civil Jurisdiction: Uncontested cases; actions under $500. S.D. COM-
PILED LAWS ANN. § 16-12A-19 (Supp. 1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Warrants; preliminary hearings; set bond from
bond schedule; guilty pleas; sentence if punishment under a $100 fine




Jurisdiction: Probate; name changes; appointment of guardians.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 30-102, -603, 37-204 (1977), 23-801 (1955).
Justice of the Peace Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Actions at law under $3,000; equity cases under
$250; recovery of personalty under $7,500; forcible entry and detain-
er. TENN. CODE ANN. § 19-301 (Supp. 1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: "Small offenses" punishable only by $50 fine;
preliminary hearings; warrants; bonds. In counties with a court of
general sessions, the justice only exercises the latter two powers.




Civil Jurisdiction: Exclusive jurisdiction where matter in controversy
is less than $500; concurrent jurisdiction with district court in cases
where matter in controversy is greater than $500, but less than $1000;
probate. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1949, 1950, 1961 (Vernon
1964).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors punishable by a fine over $200
or by jail, except in counties with a district court; de novo appellate
jurisdiction of cases tried in the municipal and appellate courts;
forfeiture of bonds; habeas corpus, except in counties where such
jurisdiction was conferred on the district court. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. arts. 1960-1 to -4 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
Justice of the Peace Court*
Civil Jurisdiction: Cases under $200. TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 19.
Criminal Jurisdiction: Crimes punishable by a fine under $200; war-
rants; preliminary hearings. TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 19; TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. arts. 2.09, 16.01, 45.18 (Vernon 1966).
Utah
Justice Court*
Civil Jurisdiction: Under $300. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-5-2 (1953).
Small-claims Jurisdiction: Under $200. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-6-1
(Supp. 1975).
Criminal Jurisdiction: City ordinances if no city court; misdemeanors
punishable by a $300 fine or six months in jail; preliminary hearings;




Civil Jurisdiction: Actions not cognizable by the district court or
superior court; appellate jurisdiction "of causes appealable to the
court." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 113 (Supp. 1974).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Offenses in the county; appellate jurisdiction"of causes appealable to the court." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 113,








Civil Jurisdiction: Actions at law under $300; unlawful entry and
detainer not involving title to realty. W. VA. CODE § 50-2-1 (1976).
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors; preliminary hearings; war-
rants; bail. W. VA. CODE § 50-18-1 to -4, -6 (1976).
Municipal Court
Jurisdiction: Municipal ordinances. W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 11.
Wisconsin
Municipal Court
Civil Jurisdiction: Civil warrants; inspection warrants. WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 300.18 (West Supp. 1977).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Criminal Jurisdiction: Misdemeanors; municipal ordinances. Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 254.045, .05 (1971).
Wyoming
Municipal Court*
Jurisdiction: Municipal ordinances punishable by a $200 fine or 90


































Probate Court, Municipal Court (Table D)
District Court Magistrates (Table C)
Justice Court, City Court (Table D)
County Court, Court of Common Pleas, Muni-
cipal Court, Justice of the Peace Court, City
Court, Police Court (Table D)
Justice Court (Table B)
County Court, Municipal Court (Table D)
Probate Court (Table D)
Justice Court, Alderman's or Mayor's Court
(Table D)
(Table A)
County Court (Tables B, C)
Probate Court (Tables B, C), Local Courts
(Table C), Justice of the Peace Court (Table D)
(Table A)
District Court Magistrates (Table D)
Associate Circuit Judges (Table B)
(Table A)
District Court Part-time Judicial Magistrates
(Table C)
District Court Magistrates (Table D)
Trial Commissioners for Inferior Courts (Table
C)
Justice of the Peace Courts, Mayor's Court
(Table D)
(Table A)
Probate Court (Table D)
(Table A)
Probate Court, Municipal Court not of Record
(Table B)
County Court, Justice Court (Table B)
Municipal Court (Table C), Justice of the Peace
Court (Table D)
Probate Court, Magistrate Court, Associate Cir-
cuit Judges (Table B), Municipal Court (Table C)
Justice Court, City Court (Table D)
Associate County Court Judges (Table D)
Justice Court, Municipal Court (Table D)
Municipal Court (Table B)























Magistrate Court (Table C), Probate Court,
Municipal Court (Table D)
Town or Village Court (Table D)
District Court, District Court Magistrates (Table
D)
County Justice Court, Municipal Court (Table
C), County Court (Table D)
County Court (Table B), Mayor's Court (Table
D)
Special District Judge, Municipal Court not of
Record (Table C)
Justice Court (Table B), Mayor's Court (Table
D)
Justice of the Peace Court, Philadelphia Traffic
Court (Table D)
(Table A)
Probate Court, Magistrate Court, Municipal
Court (Table D)
Lay Magistrates (Table D)
County Court, Juvenile Court, Court of General
Sessions, City Court (Table C), Probate Court,
Justice of Peace Court (Table D)
County Courts-at-Law, Juvenile Court, Municip-
al Court (Table C), County Court, Justice of the
Peace Court (Table D)
Justice Court (Table D)
Assistant Superior Court Judges (Table D)
District Court, Juvenile Court (Table B), District
Court Magistrates (Table D)
District Court, Justice of the Peace Court,
Municipal Court (Table C)
Magistrate Court, Municipal Court (Table D)
Municipal Court (Table D)
Justice Court (Table C), Municipal Court (Table
D)

